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ATTNEAVE and EDWARD KINGSTONE. The University of Alabama Press.
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$8.50 cloth.
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MADNESS NETWORK NEWS READER by SHERRY HERSCH and AssoCIATES. San Francisco: Glide Publications. Illus.; footnotes; analytical
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THE MENTAL HOSPITAL AND HUMAN SERVICES by HERBERT
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New York: Behavioral Publica-

tion. Biblio., indexes, analytical and statistical tables. 1975.
+ 385. Cloth.

Pp. xvii

MODELS OF MADNESS, MODELS OF MEDICINE by MIRIAM SIEGLER and HUMPHREY OSMOND. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc. Biblio., indexes, tables. 1974. Pp. xxi + 287. $8.95

cloth.
POLITICS, MEDICINE, AND SOCIAL SCIENCE by DAVID MECHANIC.
New York: Wiley. Chapter notes, index, tables. 1974. Pp. x + 306.
$12.95 cloth.
THE PURSUIT OF MENTAL HEALTH by MELVIN HERMAN and
LuCY FREEMAN.

New York: Macmillan.

Index.

1974.

Pp. 135.

$6.95 cloth.
FrancisX. Grollig, S.J.*
In the literature on the topic of mental health there are nearly as many
perspectives as there are authors and editors. Moreover, in the last
decade a trend that can be praised or damned-but not ignored-is the
reorganization of mental health delivery services on a community basis,
or within a "catchment area," to use a now favored word. In this review
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we consider some of the works presented in 1974-1975 by these authors
and editors as they explore some of the facets of community mental health.
What was once, perhaps, a simple one-to-one relationship between a
practitioner and a patient now, more frequently than not, must reckon with
a third component, the federal government. The patient himself once
dealt with a person, his or her psychiatrist for example; now he deals with
the health team at the hospital. The latter institution, in order to qualify
for certain funds, must in turn comply with federal regulations. How did
all of this come about?'
In the field of mental health the Community Mental Health Centers
Act (CMHCA) 2 is a sort of watershed. Passed in 1963, one of its goals
was the reduction of the numbers of patients, mainly in state mental hospitals, who were in custodial care. To qualify for federal funds community
mental health centers must provide "inpatient and outpatient care, emer'3
gency services, partial hospitalization, and consultation and education.'
Beyond Clinic Walls, published by the Psychiatric Outpatient Centers
of America, clearly supports the CMHCA goal, but regretfully "[.tihe
great dreams held out for the Community Health Center Movement have
not been realized."' 4 The contribution, "Mental Health Outpatient Centers: Relevant or Irrelevant to Mexican Americans?" by Grace Burruel
and Nelba Chavez is a fine analysis of the culture-value component in
health care for minorities. This component is illustrated in the Tucson
hospital, La Frontera, which serves a geographic area that is composed
largely of Mexican Americans. 5
Another contribution to this volume is the "Symposium: The Right to
Treatment" in which the contributors have done a splendid job in presenting pertinent legal matter. Attorney George Dean discusses the legal re* Professor and Chairman, Department of Anthropology, Loyola University of
Chicago. A.B., A.M., Loyola University of Chicago; Ph.L, S.T.B., West Baden College; Ph.D. (Anthropology), Indiana University.
1. See generally MEDICINE AND SOCIETY IN AMERICA (C. Rosenberg ed. 1972).
This series of forty-seven volumes purportedly covers every phase of the relationship
between medicine and society since the end of the eighteenth century. It also provides an in-depth analysis of the historical background for. some of the legal issues
involved in the rights and duties of patients and physicians vis a vis the growing governmental control of health programs.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2661 (1970).
3. H. SCHULBERG & F. BAKER, THE MENTAL HOSPITAL AND HuMAN SERvicEs 23
(1975) [hereinafter cited as SCHULBERG &BAKER].
4. BEYOND CLINIC WALLS Xi (A. Tulipan, C. Attneave & E. Kingston eds.
(1974) [hereinafter cited as BEYOND CLINIC WALLS].
5. See id. at 108-30.
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suits of the landmark case Wyatt v. Stickney,8 and adds some of the practical results including "[e]ven George Wallace has gotten religion."
The final contributors to the symposium, James Morris and Thomas
Fanning, indicate that since the public served by the outpatient clinics "are
not involuntarily committed," they are given "the right to treatment as an
ethical and moral obligation" but not as a legal one under the construction
7

of the Wyatt v. Stickney case.
The Pursuit of Mental Health by Melvin Herman and Lucy Freeman
laments that President Kennedy's "bold new approach to mental illness" s

embodied in the CMHCA has become a dream that "has been halted by
the Nixon administration." This little (135 page) volume has not footnotes, no bibliography, and no statistical tables to get in the way of the
"average" reader or to help the scholar, and the number of very short sentences seems excessive. There is no preface or introduction, and nowhere
did this reviewer find the credentials of the co-authors. 10
The political implications of the use of Dr. Ellsberg's files and of the
psycho-slanted political problems of Senators Eagleton and McGovern are
discussed." No one would disagree with the "unfulfilled needs" briefly
commented on in the closing chapter of the book. These "needs" include
skilled therapists, more federal funds, services for children and improved
facilities.

12

The Mental Hospital and Human Services is a scholarly work by Her-

bert C. Schulberg and Frank Baker. There is a summary for each chapter
6.

325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (holding that the mentally ill and the

retarded have a right to treatment, an adequate staff, and that a humane environment
must be provided by the state to cope with this right to treatment). The state must
conform to standards "if it is to operate a mental health and retardation program."
BEYOND CLINIC WALLS at 147.
7. See BEYOND CLINIc WALLS at 156.
8. M. HmMA & L. FREEMAN, THE PURSUIT OF MENTAL HEALTH 29 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as HERMAN &FREEMAN].
9. Id. at31.
10. The dust jacket of the book identifies Melvin Herman simply as the "executive secretary of the National Association of Private Psychiatric Hospitals ...
[who] writes a monthly column for the Science Digest." The Library of Congress
lists Lucy Freeman as the "joint author" of this book while the dust jacket lists her
as "the well known author of more than a dozen books." Ms. Freeman is also the
co-author of The Two Assassins, a work which was referred to as a "quick book"
by Time magazine. Love Thy Analyst, Time, Mar. 24, 1975, at 76.
11. A politician's job is in jeopardy if the confidentiality of psychoanalysts' files
is not respected. Psychiatrists and psychoanalysts in an annual convention (Honolulu 1973) issued a formal protest against "the use of such information to discredit
an individual or to influence the political process." HERMAN & FREEMAN at 14.
12. Id. at 127-35.
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and a fine flow throughout the book. "Human services" is the razor's
edge for survival: "Other mental hospitals which for societally determined
or organizationally induced reasons are not functioning within a contemporary framework of systematically related human services should be phased
out and closed" within a period of years. 18 The authors support their conclusions with twenty-three pages of documentation.
Once more the theme recurs: the CMHCA is a lever that will be used
to tip the balance in health-care "from institutional, inpatient services to
community-based, outpatient ones."' 4 The authors present an open systems study of mental health organizations, intending it to serve as a model
for others. The open organizational system is devised to show a multigoal model that can provide patient care, research and training through
four interacting aspects: input (the total case histories of both patient and
staff), throughput (the internal operating and management subsystems
of a hospital), output (the sum total of patients released, students trained,
research accomplished), and feedback (the patients, other people, and
data subsequently supplied to the hospital from other environmental systems) "which determine the state of the system at any time."' 5 It will
probably take at least a decade of tough testing to prove the worth of this
complex and expensive conceptual guide to organizational change.',
The Madness Establishment is Ralph Nader's Study Group Report on
the National Institute of Mental Health. From beginning to end there
is a devastating criticism of the lack of accountabliity of the centers established under the CMHCA. Ultimately, this means that "all centers, no
matter what they are doing, continue to receive public money from
NIMH." 7 This bit of information came from an "Internal NIMH memo"
-possibly never meant for publication. One cannot but be amazed at
13. SCHULBERG & BAKER at 350.
14. Id. at xi.
15. Id. at 99.
16. Equally important will be the training of professionals to handle this organizational change. See Schreiber, Anthropology in a Public Health Curriculum, to be
published in the Proceedings of the Forty-first International Congress of Americanists (1974).
17. See F. CHu & S. TRoTrER, THE MADNESS ESTABLISHMENT 201 (1974) [here.
inafter cited as CHu &TaoTTmR]:
Those centers which are doing a better job are doing so because of their
leadership, not because NIMH has required them to do so. The lack of
accountability of the Centers means that all Centers, no matter what they
are doing, continue to receive public money from NIMH. If a Center is
not doing what it said it would, NIMH is not really interested in knowing.
This is the heart of the problem-the slow, sad steps which lead to a minuet of mutual deception.-Internal NIMH memo.
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the vast amount of information this book has documented by the simple
notation of the month in which the interview took place with the person
whose opinion is given.18 In the words of the authors themselves, this volume is not to "be construed as a blanket condemnation of psychiatry,"
but rather it is concerned "about the increasing vulnerability of American
psychiatry to political and institutional manipulation and its propensity for
extending itself into ever-widening spheres of interest."' 0
Models of Madness, Models of Medicine is co-authored by Miriam
Siegler and Humphry Osmond, both well known for their numerous contributions to the literature in the field of mental illness. Paul E. Huston
explains the stance of the authors:
They defend the medical model of madness because they believe it has the
most to offer the patient, his family, and society, and defend it by comparing their conception of the medical model with seven non-medical models of
madness: the moral, the impaired, the psychoanalytic, the family inter20
action, the psychedelic, the social, and the conspiratorial.

Of these eight, the medical and the first two models above "put forth a
partial or restricted rather than a global view of the problem of madness," 21 while the last five have "the implication that unseen but potentially understandable forces control the lives of us all."' 22 Such an element
of control involves, obviously, determinism (in contrast to free will) as a
prevailing factor.
In a comprehensive table the authors analyze each of the eight models
with respect to twelve components. 23 Perhaps for us the testing of the
three "rights" categories for their legal implications would be most interesting. These categories are: (1) rights and duties of subject, (2) rights
and duties of families, and (3) rights and duties of society. After briefly
commenting on a visit to a new community mental health center the authors lament: "Community mental health has no model. It uses a goulash of models .... -24 So, unfortunately, we cannot analyze the prod18. Most of the interviews took place between March and July, 1972-about the
time it would take to write a good college term paper.
19. CHu & TROTTER at xx-xxi.
20. M. SIEGLER & H. OSMOND, MODELS OF MADNESS, MODELS OF MEDICINE xvi
(1974).
21. Id. at 21.
22. Id. at 42-43.
23. See id. at 16-18. The twelve components are definition/diagnosis, etiology,
subject's behavior, treatment, prognosis, suicide, function of institution, personnel,
rights and duties of subjects, rights and duties of families, rights and duties of society
and goal of the model.
24. Id. at 166. The authors have provided in forty microfiche, their accumulated
research notes for the past twenty years, i.e., approximately 3,600 pages.
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ucts of the CMHCA in one of these model categories.
Madness Network News Reader has an ultimate goal: to put an end
to the degrading and alienating practices of the psychiatric system and to
create instead a process that validates human beings and their rights to
express themselves. '25 The Reader is divided into three sections: the
Madhouse, the Cure and the Resistance. The third of these probably will
be of greatest interest to the legal community because it deals with the
legal aspects of psychiatry. From the very beginning, there is a call for
change: the "professional help" that a mental patient now gets is soundly
denounced "by people who have experienced first-hand that kind of

'help.'

",20

In one Reader article, "Pursuing Spychiatric Pill Pushers," (is that a
typographical error or a neologism?) Dr. Caligari, a pseudonym, explains
the effects of psychiatric drugs on human beings. The legal implications
of the use of drugs that are said to do permanent brain damage and cause
"semi-temporary" side effects of body and muscle reactions seem to this
reviewer not small, but they are not even mentioned by the author.
This volume will come to an end none too quickly for many readers.
But it does have a reading list with hundreds of items neatly divided into
such topics as "Fiction," "Inmates and Asylums," "Orthodox Psychiatric
Sources" and "Heretical Sources." For those who respect the system, this
book will be disturbing, as it was meant to be.
Politics, Medicine, and Social Science is an impressive volume by David
Mechanic, in which he does so much so well it is difficult to single out
specific aspects for comments. He addresses himself to a complex series
of problems:
to identify the various points at which the social and political context affect
health and the practice of medicine, to examine social and organizational
dilemmas in medical care, to clarify the intimate relationship between medicine and psychiatric concerns, and to specify how social-science analysis
and behavioral perspectives can contribute to the formulation of health
27
policy in the future.

Below the ripples of "the rights of patients and their families to be
treated with dignity" 28 can be discerned ,the current of legal realities involved in health-care delivery and autopsy procedures. As a matter of
fact, the legal implications of many of the health problems surface very
25.
26.

MADNESS NETWORK NEWS READER 11

27.

D.

(1974).

Id. at 11.
MECHANIC, POLITICS MEDICINE,

after cited as MECHANIC].
28. Id. at 64.

AND SOCIAL SCIENCE vii

(1974)

[herein-
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easily in this volume, e.g., when the recent battles over contraception and
abortion are touched upon by the author. 29 The skeptical reception with
which birth control endeavors of the whites are being received by the
blacks in the Republic of South Africa is attributed partially to the culture
value that having children carries for the black people.3 0 American urban
anthropologists and lawyers will be interested in the discussion of cultural
differences in identification and response to illness. In New York City,
for example, the response to pain for Jewish people (emotional) differs
from that of the "Old Americans" (stoical) and the Irish, who "more frequently denied pain." Moreover, if the reaction -to pain is psychiatrically
based, rather than physically based, the patients may expose themselves
to a variety of unnecessary medical procedures.31
The volume brings together some of Dr. Mechanic's papers which have
been previously published, but most of the material is new. A chapter
entitled "The Right to Treatment: Judicial Action and Social Change"
discusses Wyatt v. Stickney, to which we have already referred. Mechanic
develops the historical background of this case and goes on to discuss
Judge Bazelon's decisions in Rouse v. Cameron"2 and Durham v. United
States.33 In the former the Judge created "[t]he major precedent for the
right to treatment; '3 4 in the latter, he proclaimed the well-known "product or mental disease or defect" test for criminal insanity.8 5 Mechanic
equates the subsequent endeavor to extend this rule to nonpsychotic conditions to an "attempt to boot-leg rehabilitation to persons charged with
criminal offenses by exculpating criminal responsibility." ' 6 The author insists that the courts "develop more competence in making judgments conof
cerning mental illness on the basis of the facts with greater awareness
87
the appropriate bounds and limits of medical and psychiatric evidence."
Mechanic walks the right-rope between use and abuse when he admits
that "drug therapy is the most significant treatment modality available to
29. id. at 10.
30. See id. at 28.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 129-31.
373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
MECHANIC at 233.

35. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954); see also MECHA1'c
at 238.
36. id. at 239.

37. Id. at 243. The problem here is that acceptance at face value, without further evaluation, of the medical and psychiatric evidence of "insanity" deprives the
defendant-patient of the due process of the law in so far as the courts' willingness
to buy medical labels turns a judicial process into a medical or psychiatric evaluation.
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psychiatry" but cautions that medication "has been one of the most frequently abused means of ward maintenance and patient control."38 The
volume concludes with a consideration of the development of an internally consistent national system of health care.
In brief, there is a tremendous interest and a vast amount of literature
being published in the field of community mental health care. The ensuing decade will probably see a multiplication of legal battles testing
whether the people who are served by the institutions under the guidance
of the government are subjected to a mental health care program that is
a marvel or a monster.

38.

Id. at 243.

COMPLICATIONS AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF RADIOLOGIC

SPECIAL PROCEDURES edited by THOMAS F. MANEY, ANTHONY
F. LALLI, and RALPH J. ALFIDI. Saint Louis: C. V. Mosby. Chapter
references; figures forms; index; tables. 1973. Pp x + 207. $23.00
cloth.
Richard A. Cooper*
This compendium of complications of radiologic special procedures is
directed toward attorneys as well as radiologists. Part I of the book encompasses two-thirds of the total pages and constitutes a brief but excellent medical review of the subject. Radiologic special procedures are infrequently performed and likely to involve bodily invasion. The most
common types of procedures, such as percutaneous femoral and axillary
angiography, neuroangiography, and others are discussed. Reactions to
contrast media and even electrical microshock hazards, rarely mentioned
in the radiologic literature, are described. Also included is a statistical
analysis of complications based on a large series of procedures. This
analysis enables the radiologist to predict complication rates in future proceedings. A reason for almost every complication, whether established
or theoretical, is given. Specific technical suggestions dealing with the reduction of the incidence of radiologic complications are discussed.
The authors present a reliable evaluation of the field. They recognize
that "physicians are not inclined to publish reports on complications for
national scrutiny" (p.15). They even state that some complication rates
are probably higher than the current literature indicates.
Of particular interest to lawyers is the discussion of relative competence.
A major factor in malpractice suits is the physician's delivery of "ordinary
care." The discussion and statistics regarding the complication rates for
coronory arteriography are of interest. In those institutions where such
undertakings are infrequent, the complication rate is dramatically higher
when compared to rates at institutions where many such procedures are
performed. To which standard is the physician at the less active hospital
held-the standard of his institution or to that of the busier institution?
* Junior Staff Radiologist, University Hospital, Boston University Medical Center. B.A., Washington University; M.D., Loyola University, Stritch School of Medicine.
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The authors indicate that the busier hospitals began slowly; thus it could
take newer hospitals or departments years to develop a large patient populace. Could a doctor be considered competent one year and negligent two
years later because of increased patient volume and its associated expertise?
Of interest, for similar reasons, is the detailed study of 5,000 cases, in
which the less experienced physician-the resident in training or the new
specialist-exhibited a higher complication rate than that attributable to
the veteran physician. This was true for all of the ten specific complications of percutaneous femoral angieography.
Part II of the book consists of two short chapters on the problems of
the manufacture of angiographic equipment and the development of contrast media. The chapter dealing with equipment development discusses
the cooperative relationship between manufacturers and physicians in developing useful products. It explains that at present, there is no way to
perform non-destructive tests on most of the equipment. However, it
should be recognized that this chapter was written by the president of a
corporation which manufacturers radiologic equipment.
The last part of the book is entitled "Legal Implications" and is written
by three attorneys, one medical doctor, and one individual who holds both
degrees. The discussion is simple and understandable. It focuses on the
concepts of "ordinary care" and "informed consent" in malpractice cases
and the difficulty of defining those terms. There is a series of recommendations to physicians to obtain informed consents, to keep professional and
complete records, to establish good physician-patient rapport, and to cooperate with his or her attorney.
Of great value are two studies of patient responses to consent forms.
Both studies indicate that patients want to be well-informed and that such
information makes them feel more comfortable with their forthcoming procedure. Of primary significance was the finding that such information
caused only one percent of the patients to refuse their examination. This
is contrary to the belief that too much information will create patient
anxiety which may result in patients acting against their own interests by
refusing necessary procedures.
I have only two criticisms. The first is that the medical chapters may
not be totally understandable to the legal profession. If the lawyer needs
a physician to help interpret the medical chapters, then he or she is merely
listening to an expert witness. Second, I wish to express my annoyance
at the manner in which Marshall Nurenberg, LL.B., discusses the problem
of getting one physician to testify against another. Indeed, this must be
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a formidable problem and one of great frustration to attorneys. However,
I find his analogy to Charles Manson's motto, "never snitch," unacceptable. Nurenberg asserts: "In a nutshell this motto of the 'garbage people
of society' epitomizes the problems of the patient and his attorneys in
bringing a malpractice action against physicians" (p. 190). While he
later discusses the "conspiracy of silence" in an academic and acceptable
manner, this early analogy is hostile and malicious. While this volume
is better directed toward radiologists, I feel that the medical-legal specialists may benefit as well.

FRIEDMAN ON LEASES by MILTON F. FRIEDMAN. New York: Practicing Law Institute, 1974. Two Volumes. Index. $75.00
Donald J. Gralen*
Milton Friedman has produced in these two volumes an extremely practical yet scholarly tool for the practicing lawyer. This reviewer knows of
no comparable work on leases and suggests that this work should be the
keystone of any sound library on the subject.
At the outset of the work there is an exceptionally valuable discussion
of the nature of a lease, distinguishing between a lease as a conveyance
and a lease as a contract. It is illustrative of Friedman's effort that this
subject is treated concisely but well in only ten pages.
Another fine example of good scholarship combined with valuable practical aid is the treatment of continuous operation clauses in commercial
leases. Friedman, early in the discussion, presents two suggested clauses,
both which illustrate the problem and provide a workable solution.
Illustrative of some very practical help for the working lawyer are the
tables setting forth recommended figures for percentage rent clauses in different types of businesses. One of the tables encompasses cities across
the entire United States, thus making this aid more universally helpful.
Also, beginning on page 484, the author has included a set of cleaning
specifications for office space, an item rarely found in other works on this
subject. This information should prove very useful for a lawyer representing a tenant who has some bargaining power.
Mr. Friedman also includes several good examples of useful forms, such
as non-disturbance agreements and waiver of subrogation clauses.
These two problems areas always confront a lawyer negotiating a lease
and the forms supplied provide excellent suggestions.
A paperbound volume, accompanying the two hardbound volumes, constitutes the index. Thus, if you find yourself somewhere with only one
volume and you need the index, you are in trouble. This treatment probably is a result of the publisher's intention to issue a third volume, which
will require a supplemented index. There are references in a number of
*

Member, Illinois Bar.

Partner, Sidley & Austin.

B.S.C., Loyola University

School of Commerce; J.D., Loyola University School of Law.
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footnotes to the third volume "to be published." One hopes that this will
materialize.
There are some gaps in the scholarship caused perhaps by the arcane
peculiarities of the local law. For example, on page 721, the author
states: "[o]ccasionally a lease provides that any liability of landlord under
the lease shall be limited to landlord's interest in the reality." The use
of the word "occasionally" renders this statement questionable in Illinois
since a substantial majority of commercial and industrial leases are signed
by land trustees as landlords, and in almost all cases such leases contain
exculpatory clauses which require the tenant to look only to the realty.
Also, one might have hoped for a broader discussion of Jack Spring, Inc.
v. Little, 50 Ill.2d 351, 280 N.E. 2d 208 (1972), a revolutionary case
in Illinois landlord-tenant law. This case deals with the implied warranty
of habitability in a residential lease and is an exception to the principle
of independent covenants.
Notwithstanding these minor faults, this is a superior work and wellworth the investment by any lawyer practicing in the real estate area.

LAW OF ADVERTISING by GEORGE ERic ROSDEN and PETER E. RosDEN.

New York: Matthew Bender. 1974. Two Volumes. $85.00.
Jack R. Bierig*

Ironically, in choosing the title for their two-volume work, The Law of
Advertising, George Eric and Peter Eric Rosden have come close to engaging in false advertising. The title suggests a comprehensive treatise on
the legal considerations relating to the promotion of products, services, and
perhaps ideas. The book, however, offers only an incomplete and inadequate treatment of that subject.
Many areas of the law of advertising are entirely omitted. For example, the treatise does not discuss how claims made for cosmetics may
cause these products to be regulated as drugs. It ignores the unique advertising problems of products and services, such as liquor, prescription
drugs, securities and banks, which are regulated by agencies other than
the Federal Trade Commission. It does not take into account such problems as the use in advertising of flags, stamps and money.
Other important aspects of the law of advertising are not fully developed. Thus, although the existence of private regulatory bodies is
recognized in chapters 41 and 42, the substantive rules of such bodies are
completely ignored. The rules of the National Association of Broadcasters
dominate the law of radio and television advertising in certain areas, such
as toys, and have a major impact in several other areas. The policies of
the television networks on such subjects as disclosure of warranty terms
are similarly crucial. And yet these rules and policies are simply not discussed.
Likewise, while lotteries are briefly mentioned at §17.02, the complicated set of regulations governing these promotional devices is ignored.
When is a promotion a skill contest, and when is it a game of chance?
In which state should sweepstakes be voided? What is the effect of the
statement "void where prohibited?" What filing, disclosure, and winners
list requirements are imposed by various states in connection with sweepstakes? The authors leave their readers in the dark.
Very often, the authors set forth rules with almost no analysis. The
paragraph on use of the word "new" (§26.01[51]) is illustrative. The
* Member, Illinois Bar. Associate, Sidley and Austin. Instructor, IIT-Chicago
Kent College of Law. B.A., Brandeis University; J.D., Harvard Law School.
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entire discussion of the use of "new" to denote a recent product development is as follows:
In the term's use regarding a new principle, the question has arisen how

long an advertiser can use the appellation "new". This depends in part
upon the question how large a part of the population has been made acquainted with the new product, process, or principle.

This passage ignores the hard question of how much change in a product
will justify description of the product as "new." Can, for example, a
snack cake previously marketed under one brand name be legitimately
called "new" if it is renamed and marketed in a frozen form which gives
the product a change in taste and texture? The passage does not analyze
the theoretical problems in a rule which forbids use of the word "new"
in one geographical area when the product it describes has only been available in a distant location. It fails to examine what the rule should be
with respect to a product which, having been test marketed for a year,
is ready to be distributed nationally.
Often, the discussion of an issue is superficial or limited to easy cases.
In discussing the legality of restraints on adjacent broadcast, for example,
the authors state:
Doubtlessly, it is understandable, reasonable and not unfair, if a broadcasting advertiser precludes immediately adjacent competitive advertising. But
if such an agreement goes as far as to forbid competitive advertising for the
entire day, or even for an entire segment of a day, it may constitute an
unfair method of competition (§ 2.03[5][c]).

This formulation succeeds only in avoiding the difficult questions. Suppose an advertiser who purchases time on two telecasts of the World Series
seeks to prevent the advertising of competitive products on all other telecasts of the Series on the theory that he wants his product to be the only
one of its kind to be associated with this sports event. The authors ingenuously tell their readers that section three of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. §14, does not apply because it concerns "commodities" and broadcast time is not a commodity. But what of the Sherman Act's proscription
of concerted refusals to deal? If the network agrees with the advertiser
not to sell commercial time on any telecast of the World Series for the
promotion of products competitive with those of the advertiser, is the arrangement illegal per se under §1 of the Sherman Act, or is it subject to
the rule of reason? If it is to be judged by its reasonableness, what result
should be reached? The authors don't offer a clue.
Of course, enactment of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty, Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act of 1975, has made much of the discussion
of warranty law, FTC procedure, and consumer remedies outdated. The
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authors cannot be blamed for this. More serious criticisms, however, can
be made.
Even the most fundamental issues are treated in a superficial fashion.
The requirement that the advertiser and the advertising agency have a
reasonable basis for making a claim before such claim is made appears
almost as an afterthought in a chapter entitled "Procedure 'Before Administrative Law Judges." The authors do not consider what constitutes
a "reasonable basis" for different sorts of claims. They omit all mention
of the interplay of such considerations as (1) the specificity of the claim,
(2) the type of product advertised, (3) the possible consequences of a
false claim, (4) the degree of consumer reliance, and (5) the availability
of supporting evidence. They omit this analysis despite the fact that lawyers are called upon every day to undertake it in order to advise their
clients on what sort of substantiation is required for a specific claim.
In short, the reader is left with the feeling that the portions of the book
which deal with the law of advertising add little to what could be gleaned
from a glance through the CCH Trade Regulation Reporter and the Better
Business Bureau's Do's and Don'ts In Advertising Copy. To be sure,

there are some exceptions. The chapters on the relations between advertiser, agency, and media, chapters 1-3, are helpful, even though they are
somewhat redundant. Likewise, the examination of the standard of perception by which the Federal Trade Commission judges advertising
(§ 18.02) is interesting. But these few worthwhile discussions are not
enough to save the work as a whole. The reader who has been led by
the title of the Rosden treatise to expect a comprehensive analysis of the
law of advertising will be sorely disappointed.
In view of the superficiality and incompleteness of the work, it might
be wondered how the authors fill two complete volumes of text. The answer lies in the fact that much of the book is a rambling and unhelpful
discourse on the federal regulation of the communications media, coupled
with a superficial examination of a variety of subjects only tenuously related to the law of advertising.
A review of the major portion of the first volume makes clear how the
tome strays from its proclaimed subject. The authors devote all twentythree pages of chapter 4, which includes an unnecessary history of the
Commerce Clause, to reaching the conclusion that the federal government
has the power to regulate advertising-as if there had been any question.
They spend the following twenty-eight page chapter in a general discussion
of the first amendment-apparently for those readers who never took a
course in constitutional law. Other than the thought, put off for subsequent discussion, that certain forms of corrective advertising might be un-
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constitutional, the chapter's only point relating to advertising is the suggestion that cease and desist orders of the Federal Trade Commission might
,be invalid as prior restraints on speech (§5.04[c]). Can ,the authors be
serious?
Chapter 6 consists of a twenty-page diatribe against Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), in which the Supreme Court indicated that
first amendment protections do not extend to commercial advertising.
While the soundness of this decision is open to serious question,' the case
has remained the law for over three decades. It would seem, therefore,
that a law review article or other form of monograph would be a more
appropriate vehicle for a detailed discussion of the case's continuing validity than is a general treatise on the law of advertising. In any event,
there is no justification for spending time on the straw arguments that commercial advertising is not constitutionally protected because the first
amendment does not specifically mention advertising and because it is concerned only with political and religious speech (§6.03[1],[2]). Nor is
there justification for the sort of alarmist melodrama contained in the
following passage:
[I]t is a sordid fact that attacks upon the profit incentive eventually must
destroy the free enterprise system, if they are sustained for a sufficiently
long period. This attitude is thus aimed at self-destruction.
This same self-destructive attitude is glaringly obvious in the effects of the
Chrestensen case (§ 6.03[4][a]).

Whatever one may think of the wisdom of Valentine v. Chrestensen, the
experience of the past thirty-three years must demonstrate that the case
has not led to the downfall of commercial advertising or the free enterprise
system.
The next two chapters have virtually nothing to do with advertising.
Chapter 7, entitled "Access to Media," devotes ninety pages in an attempt
to refute the contention that individuals have a right of access to the
media. It includes, inter alia, a discussion of the housing discrimination
cases that originated with Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)
(§7.0413]), consideration of the government function cases growing out
of Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (§7.05), a discourse on antitrust considerations in the newspaper business, including a history of
American newspapers (§7.06), and the concession that the broadcasting
media are "press" within the meaning of the first amendment. Inclusion
of these matters could perhaps be condoned if they were mentioned in
passing, but ninety pages of such irrelevance is just too much.
1. This is especially true after the decision in Bigelow v. Virginia, 43 U.S.L.W.
4734 (U.S. June 16, 1975).
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Similarly, chapter 8 devotes forty-seven pages to a discussion of the fairness doctrine. It includes a long discussion of whether the licensing of
broadcasters is constitutional (§8.0411] [a]), a consideration of whether
the standard of "public convenience, interest and necessity" is sufficiently
detailed to support Congressional delegation of authority to the Federal
Communications Commission (§8.0411] [b]), and an argument that the
unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court in Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) should be overruled (§8.04[2]). Lengthy
discussions of matters long ago settled would be troublesome even if they
were relevant to the purported subject of the treatise. They are inexcusable when such matters are beyond the scope of the book.
Chapters 10 through 15 do contain some material relevant to the law
of advertising. Discussion of puffery (§10.06), commercial disparagement by advertising (§13.04), and the impact of advertising on products
liability actions (§14.06) are useful. These sections, however, are surrounded by discussions of unfair competition, palming-off, and trademark
and copyright law, which add nothing to the excellent and comprehensive
treatments of the same subjects in McCarthy on Trademarks and Nimmer
on Copyright. They are lost in generalized and unenlightening discussions
of federal court jurisdiction, the Erie doctrine, conflicts of law, libel and
slander, and products liability in general.
An account of the substance of the text is inadequate, however, to convey the feeling that one takes from this book that the authors are engaging
in little more than an ideological ego trip. Two examples may convey
the tone of the treatise more fully. Referring to the Red Lion case, the
authors state:
Under normal circumstances, it would be an exercise in futility to take issue with a fairly recent and unanimous decision of the Court. However,
the circumstances are not normal. Some of the holdings are merely dicta,
others have subsequently been contradicted by an opinion for the Court or
by some justices, and, finally, some of Red Lion's pronouncements constitute so dire a danger for the Freedom of the Press that detached analysis is
a sine qua non in the national interest (§ 8.04[2]).

Whatever one may think of the Red Lion decision, it is hard to imagine
a dispassionate student of the law seriously suggesting that the case constitutes so dire a threat to first amendment freedoms that the "national interest" requires its re-evaluation--even assuming, contrary to the fact here,
that such re-evaluation would be "detached."
Later, in discussing whether it is deceptive advertising to give an impression that a product feature is unique when in fact the feature is not
unique, the authors exclaim:
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Actionability grounded on allegations of implied uniqueness constitutes a
dangerous tool that could be used for the destruction of the entire advertising industry (§ 18.03[2]).

Many responsible advertising lawyers have long been counseling their clients to avoid claims which falsely imply uniqueness. A glance at most
advertising material today will reveal that such claims are generally not
made and in fact need not be made because of the diversity of product
differences. In the case of products in which there is no advertisable difference or in the case of so-called standardized products, of which there
are far fewer than the authors would have their readers believe, the
emphasis has been on creating pleasant associations with the advertised
product-a perfectly legitimate advertising technique.
These two passages reveal, perhaps more clearly than anything else in
this review, that a more accurate title for The Law of Advertising would
have been A Polemic On Behalf Of Minimizing Federal Regulation Of
The Communications Media In General And Of The Advertising Industry
In Particular. So styled, the book might attract a smaller audience, but
at least one which will not be surprised by its contents. Regardless of title,
however, the comprehensive treatise on the law of advertising in the mid1970's remains to be written.

PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press. 1975. Pp. v + 135.
MichaelA. Murray*

Justice Holmes once noted that the law sharpens the mind by narrowing
it. Perspectives on Justice, a little volume about the law and for lawyers

proves the point. By and large this work is a rather narrow view of a
large social issue. Unfortunately two-thirds of the volume is also somewhat dull when it could have been provocative.
Perhaps this judgment is pre-determined by the nature of the document. Perspectives on Justice, published in 1975 by the Northwestern
University Press, is a collection of speeches presented in the Julius Rosenthal Foundation lectures for 1973. Given the two to three year gap between the speech and the publication date, the content was bound to lose
some of its punch. This usually happens when speeches are printed later.
By its nature a speech must be timely; thus its content is geared to the
immediate interests of a specific audience. When the speech is published
two or three years later, the immediate issue changes and audience interest changes. In short, something is lost in the transition.
There is another problem, perhaps generic to publishing collections of
speeches. This is the lack of a common theme. Good speakers, in order
to give a sharp, memorable talk, project their own ideas. Unlike an edited
book, which derives from a common theme, a series of lectures is based
on individual points of view. While this may be good for the speech, it
is awkward when the speeches appear together in print.
Datedness and disassociation are two serious flaws affecting this
published volume. There are other comments to be made-some positive,
most critical.
The first chapter (and lecture) in the book is "The Concept of Justice
and the Laws of War" by Telford Taylor, who brings a remarkable array
of credentials to the subject. Professor Taylor asks the abstract and important question: are the laws of war compatible with the concept of justice? Or to put the question another way: does justice wither when war
erupts?
* Associate Professor, Public Management Program, Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University. B.A., M.A., Ph.D. (Politicial Science), University of Illinois.
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To appreciate Taylor's rather abstract answer to this weighty question,
it is probably helpful to take oneself back in time to 1972 and the swirling controversy over Cambodia, Mai Lai, and Lieutenant Calley. This
helps to understand the context of the speech but it does little to make
Taylor's discourse less abstract.
In essence, Professor Taylor refutes John Rawls' notion of what I will
call situational justice. Instead he argues the case for abstract justice: the
principle that there are immutable laws of justice between nations which
govern the conduct of all wars anywhere. This is simplifying the idea,
but this, I gather, is his basic point. The problem I have with Taylor's
thesis, given the advantage of hindsight and the recognized failure of our
involvement in Vietnam, is that Western concepts of justice simply do not
apply everywhere in the world. Indeed it seems only our imperialistic pattern to assume that they do.
Professor Taylor argues as a reasonable, rational, Western man, who
speaks from a vast knowledge of experience and codified law as it
developed in Western society. Nevertheless, for him to assume, even in
the abstract, that legal concepts such as justice apply to other countries is
to miss the lesson of what is happening in countries abroad. Our models
often do not apply. Likewise our concepts of legal or illegal wars do not
apply. Consequently it is misleading to argue, as Professor Taylor does,
that justice, in order to apply to the conduct of wars, needs only a jurisdictional mechanism. There is more to it than that. There are vast social, political, and cultural differences between countries and between their
concepts of war and the legality of war. In Cambodia it is "honorable"
for soldiers to eat the hearts and organs of their dead enemies. Is this
just or injust? By whose standards? Professor Taylor, operating in the
abstract, uses only Western measures and scales of justice. His talk provides a good survey of the narrow legal principles affecting the question.
Unfortunately he did not, in 1973, consider wider social and cultural considerations.
The second chapter is by Constance Baker Motley, a U.S. District
Judge, and is titled, "Criminal Law: 'Law and Order' and the Criminal
Justice System." Her main thesis is that there is a need to reform the
sentencing process. Or to put it another way: there is no "law and order"
in the present sentencing process.
The main reason Judge Motley sees sentencing as a central problem is
that presently there are no clear guidelines for the criminal justice process.
Consequently, much discretion is given to certain key individuals: arresting officers who decide to arrest or not; prosecutors who determine degree
and intensity of prosecution; judges who decide bail and sentencing; juries
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which can acquit or convict; wardens and prison guards who can invoke
a variety of disciplinary sanctions; and parole boards which can hear or
not hear cases. In short: "Our criminal justice system, from beginning
to end, lacks 'law and order' to a substantial degree" (p. 41).
Judge Motley favors, as a solution, specific guidelines for judges and
juries regarding sentencing and perhaps more importantly, legislated manda-tory penalties that are graduated, relatively short, and which give every
first offender probation. As a result of the kind of mandatory practices
which she advocates, Judge Motley argues that sentencing would become
impartial in the following ways:
1. The sentence would depend on the crime, not on the status of the
person charged, whether rich or poor, black or white, educated or uneducated.
2. Parole boards would exist only to consider humanitarian requests,
not to shorten sentences, since there would be minimum mandatory sentences.
3. Juries would be more willing to convict when the punishment fits the
crime; presently they acquit a guilty person when punishment is too harsh.
4. The police would be more willing to arrest for a crime committed
in their presence if sentences were not unduly harsh.
5. Lawless actions by prison officials would be eliminated.
6. Victimless crimes would be outside a criminal justice system and
guilty persons would be placed (by the legal system?) in treatment centers.
It is easy to see where mandatory penalties, both graduated and short,
might provide clear guidelines for sentencing judges and for jury decisions.
It is less obvious how mandatory penalties would affect arresting officers
and prosecutors. It is common knowledge that the arresting process is
closely linked to bias and attitude, and that prosecutorial patterns are frequently dependent on staff availability, docket backlog, and sometimes political considerations.
The biggest issue, however, is how mandatory penalties would prevent
wardens and prison-guards from lawless activities. Removing discretion
from sentencing will not itself prevent arbitrary use of sanctions in prison.
The non-imprisoned public stays far away from the scene and prisons usually are built far from population centers. Relatives of prisoners see them
infrequently and only through a screen. When prisoner complaints are
voiced they are often used as proof that "these people" are liars, ingrates,
or worse. Watchdog committees do not see a normal day in prison; rather
they see a cleaned-up version of what occurs. Physical and verbal abuse
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will not stop with the introduction of mandatory penalties: it will stop only
when there is a prisoner advocate system which includes prisoners and has
sufficient "clout" to enforce institutional change.
What does all of this have to do with Motley's procedural proposals?
The point is that if prisons themselves are part of the unjust system, why
offer procedural reforms which only marginally change these institutionalized patterns of abuse? This is one way of noting that Judge Motley's
procedural reforms, in effect, are designed to serve the interests of the
legal profession, i.e., judges, juries, lawyers, officers, and wardens. They
do little to enhance the lives of those who suffer most from the lawlessness
of the system. For example, Judge Motley says that victimless crimes,
under her reform, would be removed from mandatory judicial penalties
and would be placed within a "treatment system." This of course is a
continuing problem in the legal. system: dumping people in mental hospitals and in alcoholic treatment centers when, the law is uncomfortable with
them. If the legal system does not want to deal with alcoholism, drug
abuse, prostitution, and other victimless crimes, then it should stop labeling these activities as criminal.
Two serious criticisms of her proposals emerge. First, the mandatory
penalties process is a way of alleviating some of the problems of discretion
within the legal community, but it does little to soften the most painful
blows of discretionary punishment now borne by the non-legal community.
Second, the reform seeks procedural change and does little to question the
purposes and consequences of the correctional system, particularly prisons.
In summary, the reform offered represents a rather narrow legal point of
view.
If the first lecture was culture-bound, the second was profession-bound.
Fortunately the third lecture overcame these limiting factors. Professor
James K. Feibleman gets to the heart of the series and discusses, "Philosophical Perspectives on Justice." Professor Feibleman is not a lawyer,
but I found his remarks' perceptive and provocative. Perhaps it is my bias
that "law is too important to be left to the lawyers," which colors this critique.
In searching for the theory of justice and the definition of justice, Feibleman recognizes the essential fact *that'definitions and theories vary according to situations and conditions. Justice, in a word, is indeterminite;
this is not to say the concept is useless.
On the contrary, justice, as defined by Professor Feibleman, is "the demand for order: everything in its proper place or relation" (p. 98). He
continues by noting that justice obviously requires a system of administra-
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tion to put and keep things in place. Thus, justice becomes the demand
for a system of laws. He considers the concept of justice from many
points of view: the legal, the moral, the philosophical, and the historical.
His expertise in these areas is impressive and he gives us a lively and
interesting survey of the concepts involved. While some of his ideas are
undoubtedly abstract, the chapter as a whole is readable and interesting.
It is easy after reading Professor Feibleman to sense the importance
which this series of lectures, and ultimately this edition, represents. Perhaps, if I had read the chapters in reverse order it would have put things
in perspective. As it is, my "perspective on justice" was limited to a very
legalistic discourse on international law, a procedural blueprint for court
reform, and finally a philosophical treatise on concepts of justice. These
general criticisms and comments should not disuade the reader from selecting one or another of the chapters. Individually and in the context of
its time, each chapter is a useful contribution. However, presented in
1975 as a composite Perspective on Justice, these three dissociated viewpoints do not hold together.

SUEZ 1956: INTERNATIONAL CRISIS AND THE ROLE OF LAW
by ROBERT R. BowIE. New York: Oxford University Press. Appendices, footnotes, index. 1975. Pp. xix + 148. $7.50 cloth.
M. Cherif Bassiouni*
The nationalization of the Universal Company of the Suez Canal by
Egypt on July 26, 1956, was a most significant occurrence in contemporary international affairs because of the chain of events it triggered. The
1975 publication of this book attests to that fact as well as to the continued
timeliness of the subject it covers. Indeed, the Suez Canal, which was
closed in June 1967, has been cleared and officially reopened for navigation on June 6, 1975.
In response to the nationalization of the company, the Western world
rose up against President Nasser of Egypt, whose challenge to their economic and strategic interests signaled the decline of Western imperialism
in that part of the world. France and Great Britain's interests coincided
with the Israeli interest in maintaining military supremacy over Egypt. As
a result, France, Great Britain, and Israel conspired to attack Egypt-on
October 29, 1956, the attack began. During the U.N. debates which followed, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., in almost unprecedented united position against the tripartite aggression, co-sponsored a U.N. resolution on the
withdrawal of France, England, and Israel, and the placing of the United
Nations Emergency Force between Egypt and Israel. In April 1957,
Egypt reopened the Suez Canal for navigation and has since remained in
control of its operation.
The story of the Suez Canal may never end, because it is a vital strategic and economic passage linking the Red Sea and Indian Ocean with
the Mediterranean. The fact that the Western world has the most to gain
from the Canal partially explains the reason why most accounts of the
events of 1956 published in the United States are biased in favor of Western interests.' This book, while accurate in its contents, is nevertheless
not among the exceptions to that current. As an illustration of this fact,
the book confuses several issues. Among these are nationalization of the
* Professor, DePaul University College of Law. LL.B. Cairo University; J.D.
Indiana University; LL.M. John Marshall Law School; S.J.D., George Washington
University.
1. E.g., H. FINER, DULLES OVER SUEZ (1964); Hostie, Notes on the Inter-Statute oj the Suez Canal, 31 TUL. L. REV. 397 (1957); Gross, Passage through the Suez
Canal of Israel-BoundCargo and IsraeliShips, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 530 (1957).
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Suez Canal company, a company organized and subject to Egyptian company law, and Egypt's sovereign rights over the Canal proper, an artificial
waterway dug exclusively in Egyptian territory.2 Clearly, Egypt has certain international obligations with respect to the right of free and innocent
passage through the Canal. However, Egypt's right to nationalize a domestic company -is beyond question and should not be confused with
Egypt's international obligations concerning navigational transit.
The nationalization of the Universal Company of the Suez Canal, an
Egyptian company, is treated as if it were an international public body,
which it clearly was not. Questions of management and control of the
Canal's operation are confused with questions of transit rights and restrictions thereto. 3 Furthermore, the nationalization of the company is not
treated as a simple act of a nationalization recognized under international
law subject to adequate, just, and prompt compensation. Even then, historical facts relevant to nationalization and just compensation are omitted.
Among such facts is the history of the company which had nineteen years
remaining on its concession to operate this artificial waterway, which was
dug by Egyptian labor at the cost of some one hundred thousand lives and
with the financial support of Egypt amounting to nearly all the actual cost
of the project. 4 Nevertheless, Egypt did not mitigate or reduce its compensation to company stockholders and did indeed declare at the time of
the nationalization its willingness to pay the full market value of the nationalized shares of stock of the Suez Canal company and did so shortly
thereafter.
Indeed the complete legality of the nationalization and the full and fair
compensation to its stockholders which ensued should not only be so recognized, but it should be held out as a model of fairness. This has not happened, however, since political interests required that Egypt be made to
appear as the villain.
The author follows the events of the time in the order in which they
occurred. He also faithfully reiterates the arguments advanced by those
who were paving the way for their subsequent acts. The failure to adequately comment on the political motives of such countries as France and
England is a serious omission. Historical accuracy and critical analysis
should have revealed what the world had almost twenty years to find out.
The author furthers arguments which have been made against Egypt
2. Bassiouni, The Nationalizationof the Suez Canal and the Illicit Act in International Law, 14 DEPAuL L. REv. 258 (1965).
3. See, e.g., R. BowiE, SuEz 1956: INTERNATIONAL CMSIS AND THE ROLE OF
LAw 2-3 (1974) [hereinafter cited as BowIE].
4. Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 269-71.
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by confusing Egyptian economic concessions to the Suez Canal company
with international legal obligations. The purported effect of this approach
is to demonstrate that Egypt's economic concessions to the company's promoter, Ferdinand de Lesseps, and to the Suez Canal company proper,
were in the nature of an international dedication of the Suez Canal. This
was one of the legal strategies of the Western powers, who created in London between August and September 1956 a "user's club." The "users"
sought recognition of an international right to control the Canal on the
grounds that operational control was crucial to the exercise of their international right; namely, the right of free passage. Part of their plan was
to show that Egypt's inability to manage or properly use the Canal would
jeopardize the right of free passage, guaranteed under the 1881 Constantinople Convention, and thus warrant the take-over of the Canal by the
"users." Professor Bowie fails to explain this plan whereby the "users"
and the former Suez Canal company officials conspired with the Suez
Canal pilots to leave Egypt. Their departure was to evidence Egypt's
inability to operate the Canal, thus giving the "users" valid reasons
to seize the Canal, under the pretext of fulfilling international obligations
to insure free passage through the canal for the world. This effort failed,
however, because Egyptian naval officers and civilian navigation pilots assumed the task, which they performed well, of leading vessels through the
Canal. 5 The author of this book doesn't mention this plan which was crucial to the "users'" strategy of claiming the internationalization of the
Canal and the control of its operation. Instead, he states: "How could
the users ensure that Nasser would manage the Canal efficiently and not
misuse its control to serve his political purposes." 6
The subtitle of the book indicates its emphasis on the role of law in
the resolution of this "crisis." In that respect, Egyptian efforts at a
peaceful solution are accurately presented, but in the context of an attempt to extol the virtues of John Foster Dulles as the principle protagonist of a "peaceful settlement."' 7 Considering Dulles' role in making the
crisis by sponsoring the "user's club" and proposing an internationalization
of the Canal which would, in fact, perpetuate foreign control of Egyptian
territory and property, it is hardly to be commended. Dulles, however,
deserves and is given due credit by the author, as is President Eisenhower,
for their firm stand at the U.N. in condemning the actions of France,
5.

(1967);

6. Bowm at ix.
7.

Fouorr OVER WAR (1969); A. NuTrINo, No
ROBERTSON, CRISIS: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE SUEZ CON-

See K. LOVE, SuEz: THE TWICE

END OF A LESSON
sPIRAcY (1965).

Id. at 35-47.
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Great Britain and Israel, and causing their withdrawal from occupied
Egyptian territory.
The book condemns Egypt for its denial of Israel's right to transit the
Canal, but fails to present Egypt's arguments for the denial. The 1881
Constantinople Convention gives Egypt the right to refuse passage for defensive reasons, as do other international law principles. 8 However, even
though Egypt's position is criticized on that issue, the author fails to mention that Great Britain did just that to Germany in World Wars I and II
without as much as a whisper of protest by anyone. Further, the author
completely ignores the context of Egypt's denial of navigation rights to Israeli vessels and Israeli-bound cargo; namely, the existence of a state of
war between Egypt and Israel. The question of navigation rights deserved
more than the scant treatment it received, for it is still a contemporary
problem.
In his conclusion the author chides Israel for its aggression: "Despite
the violations of Israel's rights, it was still hard to square its resort to force
with the provisions of the Charter." As to the aggression of France and
Great Britain, the author concludes: "Their case for self-help was less
clear [than Israel's]; they had not exhausted efforts for a peaceful solutions.
...l0 However what the author refers to as "Israel's rights" and
France and England's "case for self-help" is far from convincing.
A noteworthy observation about this book concerns its sources of authority: throughout, there is only one reference to an Egyptian author'
and few authors cited are sympathetic to the Egyptian position. 12 All other
works cited are U.S. and British authors and governmental sources which
are either unsympathetic to the Egyptian position or who condemn it.
There are, however, several Israeli and pro-Israeli authors cited repeats
edly.'
8.

See Khadduri, Closure of the Suez Canal to Israeli Shipping, 33 LAw &

CONTEMP. PROB. 147 (1968); but see Gross, supra note 1.
9.

BowIE at 104.

10.

Id.

11.

M. EL-HEFANAOUi, LES PROBLAMES CONTEMlPORAINS POSS PAR LE CANAL DE

SUEZ (1951).
12.

See LOVE, supra note 5; ROBERTSON, supra note 5; Khadduri, supra note 8.

13. E.g., FINER, supra note 1; see also Bowm at 55, 59, 93 (Ben Gourion);
BOWIE at 56 (Dayan); BOwIE at 56-57 (Bar-Zohar); BowIE at 56-59 (Peres); BowIE
at 57 (Kimche).
14. See, e.g., Huang, Some International and Legal Aspects of the Suez Canal
Questions, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 277 (1957).
15. The author does however cite ROBERTSON, supra note 5; LovE, supra note 5;
NUTriNo, supra note 5, whose insights are quite revealing. For a contrary position
see FINER, supra note 1; EL-HEFANAOUI, supra note 11; see also M. & S. BROMBERO,
SECRETS OF SuEz (1957) (discussing France's political motives).
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The book offers a good chronology of the events and a concise statement of the Western position. The documents it contains are of great historical interest; however, there is no adequate presentation of the legal issues involved 14 and only a superficial political appraisal of the events recounted. 1 5 It would have otherwise been a welcome contribution.

TRANSPORTATION AND THE DISADVANTAGED: THE POOR,
THE YOUNG, THE ELDERLY, THE HANDICAPPED by JOHN C.
Lexington, Massachusetts:
FALCOCCHIO and EDMUND J. CANTILLI.
Lexington Books. End notes keyed to chapters; tables; appendices; index. 1974. Pp. xxiii + 189. $16.00 cloth.
Dr. Rolf-Helmut Ehrmann*
Roll F. Ehrmann**
Transportationand the Disadvantagedis an eclectic and technical book

in which the authors seek to deal with a wide range of interrelated subjects. In it the authors attempt to identify the transportation problems
of the disadvantaged, i.e. the elderly, the young, the handicapped, and the
poor in particular. They also review and criticize the various federally
funded demonstration projects which had been directed toward alleviating
some of these problems. Furthermore, while concentrating on the unemployed poor, the authors create a scientific model by which a cost-benefit
analysis may be made as to the impact of different levels of transportation
improvements on unemployment. In addition, the authors make recommendations for improving transportation planning methodology. In summary this book proposes to compile and analyze information on mass
transportation and the four groups of individuals whose lives are most affected by it.
The authors present information which indicates that as income decreases car ownership decreases. The result is that the poor are more
dependent upon public transportation than any other group. Since our
auto dominated society is experiencing a decentralization of industry, the
poor are facing even greater constraints of cost and travel time because
public transportation systems generally serve only the central business district. Consequentially, the places of employment are becoming less accessible to them.

In a review of federally funded demonstration projects which ostensibly
were to provide the poor with transportation to new job opportunities, the
* Patent Assessor, Patent Department, Universal Oil Products Company. Dipl.Chem., Dr. rer. nat., Ernst Moritz Arndt Universitat (Greifswald, Germany).
** Member, Illinois Bar. Appellate Prosecutor, Illinois State's Attorneys Assoc.,
Appellate Assistance Service, Mt. Vernon, Illinois. B.A., Northeastern Illinois University; J.D., DePaul University College of Law.
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authors find that the criterion used to determine the ultimate success of
the improvements was whether they had produced a profit to the operators. The authors fault the federal agencies involved for not detailing information on the actual social benefits derived from the projects; information which parenthetically could also have been used to justify continuing
public subsidies. In a specific case study, the authors estimate the unemployment reduction attributable to certain transportation improvements.
They demonstrate that though the improvements are not self-supporting,
public subsidies to public transportation are justified because they actually
result in a net savings to -the public treasury. The net savings is derived
from the reduced costs of social welfare services to the newly employed
poor as well as from other benefits similarly related to reduced unemployment.
The veracity of these conclusions is supported by a product which is
itself of great significance. At a time when the issues of mass transportation and rising social welfare cost are important concerns, the authors have
created a method by which the relationship between transportation improvements and unemployment may be quantified. Using their method,
more rational plans may be developed: estimates may be obtained of the
costs and benefits derived from alternative transportation plans prior to
their implementation.
In light of this accomplishment it is particularly disappointing that the
authors would be unsuccessful in bringing the main objective of the book
to fruition. The book was meant to be about the transportation problems
of all disadvantaged groups. Yet the authors have failed to give a similar
discussion, evaluation and analysis to the handicapped. By their failure
the authors have missed an opportunity to fill a void that now exists in
transportation planning.'
Statistics are presented showing that there are over thirteen million handicapped with transportation problems. This figure may be as high as
forty million if it includes both the permanently and temporarily disabled.
The authors also estimate a latent demand by the handicapped for transportation services which could result in a seventy-two percent increase in
travel by these people. Thus there exists a large group of citizens in great
need of transportation.
The nature of this need is explained by the authors in terms of "life
space." The life space of children may include only their home, school
and play areas. The life space of the elderly may be confined to the
home, shopping, medical and visiting areas. On the other hand, the life
1. See 40 Fed. Reg. 8314 (197.5).
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space of adults usually covers a large spatial area because of their involvement in a variety of activities. So too, the disabled adult has m6:bility needs which are not different from the general adult population.
Yet a single step may-prevent a wheelchair-bound lawyer from entering
a courtroom to conduct his business and an elevator without buttons
marked in braille is enough to deny a blind person access to an entire
building. Thus the life space of a handicapped person is arbitrarily
limited by physical barriers. A disabled person who seeks to be self-supporting finds that the current public transportation systems have insurmountable physical barriers which separate him from his potential job.
Any alternative private means of transit may be too costly or simply unavailable.
Harold L. Willson of the Kaiser Foundation Medical Care Program,
in Oakland, California, has succeeded in having San Francisco's new Bay
Area Rapid Transit System (BART) modified to be accessible to the handicapped and the elderly. BART is an example of the fact that physicale
barriers in public transportation can be effectively eliminated by proper
planning and modern technology. 'In addition, the authors imply that the
cost of the modifications was not a very significant addition to the overall
cost of the system. But the authors have failed to produce any actual
data on these costs. Their sudden switch to a purely superficial qualitative discussion of this area is puzzling indeed since the BART System
offers them an opportunity to produce a rich, in-depth, cost-benefit analysis. Such an analysis should have explored the benefits derived from the
system as a whole as well as from each individual modification and would
have greatly aided transportation planners. A mere description of the
needs of the handicapped cannot serve as a surrogate for actual estimates
of potential use and potential cost.
The desire for such information is not restricted to the transportation
planning community. The legal profession's interest in this area stems
from the changing attitudes of those within the profession as well as those
whom they serve. Redress has been offered to those with a physical disability through a fault system based on tort theory. However, in a modern, compassionate, and effective social order redress must also be offered2
to those whose physical impairment cannot be remedied in a suit in tort.
Remedial action aimed at the broad spectrum of problems affecting the
handicapped is required.
Increasingly, the handicapped are insisting on their legitimate legal
rights under the burgeoning constitutional concept of "equal rights." The
2. See generally G. CALABRESI, THE CosT OF AcciDENTs (1970).
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Supreme Court has declared that the right to travel and the right to use
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce are fundamental rights under
the U.S. Constitution.3 A classification by transportation planners of
those who shall have limited access to transit facilities will be strictly scrutinized by the courts and will have to be based on a compelling state interest in order to be justified. 4 ,If the approach these authors used in studying the problems of the poor had also been used to study the problems
of the handicapped, this book would have been very helpful in this decision-making process.
In discussing transportation and the handicapped the authors state that
they saw an almost "complete neglect" of this group by the government.
It must be reported that this tradition of neglect has been carried forward
for another year in publications generally and in this book in particular.

3. See, e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969).
4. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Levy v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 68 (1968). See also Note, Abroad in the Land: Legal Strategies to Effectuate
the Rights of the Physically Disabled, 61 Go. L.J. 1501 (1973).

